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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 08-1603 
_____________ 
 
DIANA BANKS; ALOMA BARNABAS; FRANKLIN 
BARNABAS; 
 PATRICIA JOSEPH; MERLE PENHA-MURPHY,  
                                                             Appellants  
 
v. 
 
INTERNATIONAL RENTAL AND LEASING 
CORPORATION 
d/b/a Budget Rent A Car 
_____________ 
 
No. 08-2512 
_____________ 
 
DIANA BANKS; ALOMA BARNABAS;  
FRANKLIN BARNABAS; PATRICIA JOSEPH; 
MERLE PENHA-MURPHY,  
                                   Appellants 
v. 
 
INTERNATIONAL RENTAL AND LEASING 
CORPORATION  
d/b/a Budget Rent A Car;  
 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
District Judge: Hon. Chief Judge Curtis V. Gomez 
Nos.02-cv-00200, 02-cv-00201, 02-cv-00202, 02-cv-00203 
Argued December 2, 2009 
 
Before:  McKee, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges 
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(Filed: May 23, 2012) 
 
Robert L. King, Esquire  [ARGUED] 
Law Offices of Robert L. King, Esq. 
1212 Bjerge Gade 
P .O. Box 9768 
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00801 
 Counsel for the Appellants 
 
Michael J. Sanford, Esquire  [ARGUED] 
Sanford, Amerling & Associates 
2191 Church Street 
Christiansted, Virgin Islands 00820 
 Counsel for the Appellee 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
  
 Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) sustained injuries while they 
were passengers in a van rented from International Renting 
and Leasing d/b/a Budget Rent-A-Car (“Budget”).  The 
injuries occurred when the van crashed into a tree after the 
brakes failed.  Plaintiffs brought suit against Budget, raising 
among other allegations, claims of strict liability, breach of 
warranty, and loss of consortium.  The District Court entered 
summary judgment in favor of Budget after concluding that 
Plaintiffs could not recover because they had not leased the 
van from Budget and were not authorized drivers under the 
rental agreement.  For the reasons that follow, we will reverse 
the entry of summary judgment in favor of Budget on the 
strict liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium 
claims and remand for further proceedings.
1
  
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment is 
plenary, and we apply the same legal standard as the district 
court; we consider whether there are any genuine issues of 
material fact such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 Franklin Barnabas rented a van from Budget and gave 
his sister-in-law, Diane Dewindt, permission to use it without 
listing her as an authorized driver on the rental agreement.  
Thereafter, Dewindt was driving down a steep hill when the 
brakes failed.  Dewindt attempted to stop the van by driving 
onto an uphill driveway.  The van came to a stop when it 
crashed into a tree, injuring the passengers. Barnabas was not 
in the van. 
 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed four separate suits against 
Budget in the District Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1332,
2
 and the cases were consolidated for 
purposes of discovery and trial.  The District Court decided 
the case by applying the Second Restatement of Torts which 
does not subject lessors to strict liability and granted 
summary judgment in favor of Budget on each of Plaintiffs’ 
claims.  This appeal followed. 
 
II. Strict Liability 
Section 4 of the Virgin Islands Code provides:  
The rules of the common law, as expressed 
in the restatements of the law approved by 
the American Law Institute, and to the 
extent not so expressed, as generally 
understood and applied in the United States, 
shall be the rules of decision in the courts of 
the Virgin Islands in cases to which they 
apply, in the absence of local laws to the 
contrary.   
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (2011).  We therefore look to 
the restatements of law for guidance.  
                                                                                                     
for the plaintiffs.  Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
2
 Diane Dewindt and another of the passengers, Zyanguelyn 
Poe, are not parties to this action. 
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As we will explain, the District Court relied on cases 
that had been decided under  Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement of Torts which does not recognize strict liability 
claims against lessors of defective products.  Banks v. Int’l 
Rental and Leasing Corp., Nos. 2002, 200-203, 2008 WL 
501171, at *3 (D.V.I. Feb. 13, 2008).  Section 402A provides: 
 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is 
subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or 
to his property if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user 
or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 
although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care 
in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and  
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).  
Since strict liability under § 402(A) does not extend 
to a lessor such as Budget, the District Court was 
clearly correct in dismissing the strict liability claims 
if the Second Restatement controlled that court’s 
analysis.   
 
 
However, in adopting the Third Restatement 
of Torts for Products Liability, the American Law 
Institute rethought the limitations on strict liability 
contained in the Second Restatement and extended 
strict liability beyond the Second Restatement’s 
limitation to sellers.  Thus, Section 1 of the Third 
Restatement of Torts states: “[o]ne engaged in the 
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business of selling or otherwise distributing products 
who sells or distributes a defective product is subject 
to liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the defect.”  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability, § 1 (1998) (emphasis added).  Section 20(b) 
provides as follows: 
 
One otherwise distributes a product when, in a 
commercial transaction other than a sale, one 
provides the product to another either for use 
or consumption or as a preliminary step 
leading to ultimate use or consumption.  
Commercial nonsale product distributors 
include, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, 
and those who provide products to others as a 
means of promoting either the use or 
consumption of such products or some other 
commercial activity. 
 
Id. § 20(b).  Strict liability under the Third 
Restatement would thus reach Budget as 
lessor/distributor of the allegedly defective van.  
 
 The District Court did not specifically address the 
issue of which Restatement should apply here.  Instead, citing 
Manbodh v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., No. 324/1997, 2005 WL 
3487838, at *11 (V.I. Super. Nov. 28, 2005), the District 
Court held that “Section 402A is the controlling law on 
products liability in the Virgin Islands.”  Banks, 2008 WL 
501171, at *3.  The District Court then relied on a 1982 
decision of the territorial court to support its conclusion that 
“[u]nder section 402A, an action for strict product liability 
cannot be maintained against a lessor of chattels.”  Id. (citing 
Pynes v. American Motors Corp., 19 V.I. 278, 280 (1982)). 
 
 Where, as here, the outcome of a suit in federal court 
turns on an unresolved issue of local law, the United States 
Supreme Court has encouraged federal appellate courts to 
seek guidance from the highest court of the appropriate 
jurisdiction if that court has adopted procedures for accepting 
certified questions of law.  See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 
U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).  The Supreme Court of the Virgin 
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Islands has adopted rules establishing a procedure to decide 
questions of Virgin Islands law certified by this Court.  See 
V.I. S. CT. R 38.  Virgin Islands Supreme Court Rule 38 
states in part:  
 
[t]he Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands may 
answer questions of law certified to it by a court 
of the United States . . . if there is involved in 
any proceeding before the certifying court a 
question of law which may be determinative of 
the cause then pending in the certifying court 
and concerning which it appears there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the 
Supreme Court [of the Virgin Islands. 
 
Id.  Moreover, we have stated that we will “defer to decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands on matters of local 
law unless we find them to be manifestly erroneous.”  
Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 89 (2010). 
 
Accordingly, we certified the following question to the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to Rule 38 of 
that court and our own Local Appellate Rules:
3
 “Whether, 
under Virgin Islands law, including V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1 § 4, 
a plaintiff may pursue a strict liability claim against a lessor 
for injuries resulting from a defective product.”4 
 
Virgin Islands On December 15, 2011, in a 
commendably thorough and very well reasoned opinion, the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands explained that even 
though the courts of the had historically applied the Second 
Restatement of Torts, see Pynes, supra, “[w]e conclude that 
the Legislature did not intend for section 4 of title 1 to compel 
this Court to mechanically apply the most recent 
Restatement.”  Banks v. International Rental and Leasing 
Corp., No. 2011-37, 2011 WL 6299025, at *3 (S. Ct. V.I. 
                                              
3
 See 3rd Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 110.0 and Internal Operating 
Procedure 10.9. 
4
 See Banks v. Int’l Rental and Leasing Corp., Nos. 08-
1603, 08-2512, 2011 WL 7186340, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 
19, 2011). 
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Dec. 15, 2011).
5
  After examining the historical development 
of the incorporation of the various restatements into the law 
of the Virgin Islands, the court examined the conflict between 
the applicable provisions of the Second Restatement and the 
Third Restatement.  In doing so, the court noted that the 
District Court had correctly concluded that “section 402A [of 
the Second Restatement] has received widespread acceptance 
in Virgin Islands courts.”  Id. at *6.   
    
    However, based upon its examination of evolving trends in 
the law, the Supreme Court stated: “[n]evertheless, we 
decline to endorse the Pynes rule.” Id.  Rather, the court noted 
“a strong preference exists for following the most recent 
Restatement over an older version . . . .”  Id.  (citing Varlack 
v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1977).  
After a very persuasive analysis, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court held in part: “rather than continue to apply the Pynes 
decision . . ., Virgin Islands local courts should apply sections 
1 and 20 of the Third Restatement and allow lessors to be 
held strictly liable for injuries resulting from a defective 
product.”  Id.  at *7. 
 
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment to Budget 
pursuant to § 402(A) of the Second Restatement of Torts 
must be reversed, and this case must be remanded to allow 
Plaintiffs to pursue their strict liability claims against Budget 
pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Third 
Restatement.  
 
III.  Breach of Warranty. 
 The District Court concluded that Plaintiffs were not 
entitled to recover for breach of either express or implied 
warranties because Plaintiffs were not in privity with Budget 
                                              
5
  A copy of the opinion of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
is attached to this opinion as an Appendix.  We take this 
opportunity to thank that court for its very helpful assistance 
in resolving the Plaintiffs’ strict liability claims. 
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and were not intended beneficiaries of any of the provisions 
of the rental agreement with Budget.
6
   
  
 Before we address the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
District Court erred in dismissing their warranty claims, we 
must address Budget’s argument that Plaintiffs never raised a 
third-party beneficiary claim in the District Court.  Appellee 
Br. at 20.  Budget claims that, “at best” Plaintiffs only argued 
that Dewindt, the driver, was the authorized agent of the 
renter when Dewindt drove into the tree.  Id. at 20-21.  
Significantly, Budget does not argue that express or implied 
warranties do not apply, only that Plaintiffs have not 
previously raised the issue.  
  
 In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged: “when Defendant 
Budget provided to Plaintiffs a vehicle with a flawed and 
defective breaking [sic] system, that act constituted a breach 
of contract and a breach of duty owed to one in the position of 
Plaintiffs, thereby entitling them to maintain this claim for 
relief.”  Banks v. Int’l Rental and Leasing Corp., Nos. 2002, 
200-203, 2008 WL 2149380, at *2 (D.V. I. May 19, 2008) 
(quoting Pls. Comp. at ¶¶ 21-22).  Although Budget argues 
that Plaintiffs did not cite to the applicable provisions of the 
Virgin Islands Uniform Commercial Code when that 
argument was pressed, we find any such omission irrelevant.  
The court had to apply the applicable law to that claim once 
Plaintiffs raised it, and it is clear to us that they did raise a 
claim for recovery in contract.
7
  
                                              
6
  Since Franklin Barnabas was not a passenger in the car 
when it collided with the tree, his only claim is for loss of 
consortium based on injuries his wife received while she was 
a passenger.  The District Court dismissed his claim for loss 
of consortium because that claim was derivative and therefore 
must rise or fall with his wife’s claims.   
7
 Section 2A-216 of the Virgin Islands Uniform Commercial 
Code extends to express and implied warranties and states: 
 
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee 
under this Article, whether express or implied, 
extends to any person who may reasonably be 
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured by breach of the 
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 Moreover, since it is now apparent that Plaintiffs may 
pursue a theory of strict liability, the District Court should 
have the opportunity to determine whether Plaintiffs may rely 
on warranties in the rental agreement with Budget.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the Plaintiffs can present those 
claims on remand.
8
  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on the strict liability, 
breach of warranty, and loss of consortium claims, and 
remand for proceedings consistent with the foregoing 
opinion. 
  
 
                                                                                                     
warranty.  The operation of this section may not 
be excluded, modified, or limited with respect 
to injury to the person of an individual to whom 
the warranty extends, but an exclusion, 
modification, or limitation of the warranty, 
including any with respect to rights and 
remedies, effective against the lessee is also 
effective against the beneficiary designated 
under this section. 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 11A, § 2A-216 (2011). 
8
 Similarly, since (as the District Court noted), Franklin’s 
claim for loss of consortium is derivative to any claims his 
wife may have, we also conclude that the District Court must 
consider Franklin’s claim for consortium on remand. 
